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DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT: STRAUSS, ARENDT, AND
VOEGELIN IN AMERICA
STEPHEN M. FELDMANt
During the 1930s, American democratic government underwent a
paradigmatic transformation.' From the framing through the 1920s, the
United States operated as a republican democracy. Citizens and elected
officials were supposed to be virtuous: in the political realm, they were
to pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own "par-
tial or private interests."2 Intellectually, republican democracy had
premodern roots stretching back to antiquity. 3 As such, republican demo-
cratic theorists often conceptualized the common good in objectivist
terms, as if there existed a distinct good that could be clearly ascer-
tained.4 Equally important, for at least a century, republican democracy
seemed to fit the agrarian, rural, and relatively homogenous American
society. Thomas Jefferson, for one, insisted that the agrarian economy
and widespread rural land ownership promoted a virtuous commitment to
the common good.5 And given that, in the nation's early decades, an
overwhelming number of Americans were Protestants who traced their
ancestry to Western or Northern Europe, the people seemed sufficiently
homogeneous to join together in the pursuit of the common good.6
Of course, some Americans did not fit the mold. Not all were white
Protestant Anglo-Saxons. Exclusion, however, preserved at least a sur-
face homogeneity. According to republican democratic theory, non-
virtuous individuals (or non-virtuous societal groups) would not be will-
t Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
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1. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 291-382 (2008) (discussing extensively a transition from republican to pluralist democra-
cy).
2. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 59
(1969); see also, e.g., VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE,
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1908 (1877) (emphasizing government for "the common benefit").
3. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
4. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTtNE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 21-22 (1975); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250 (2d ed. 1942).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 GREAT
ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY 112, 115 (Richard
Hofstadter ed., 1982); see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 7
(2d ed. 1977) (emphasizing importance of land ownership).
6. See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of
the First Amendment 219 (1986); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 161-68 (1997), THE
FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasizing the homogeneity of
the American people).
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ing to forgo the pursuit of their own private interests. Instead, they would
form factions bent on corrupting republican democratic government.
Thus, an alleged lack of civic virtue could justify the forced exclusion of
a group from the polity. On this pretext, African Americans, Irish-
Catholic immigrants, women, and other peripheral groups were preclud-
ed from participating in republican democracy for much of American
history.' Typically, then, particular conceptions of virtue and the com-
mon good mirrored mainstream white Protestant values and interests.
Over time, a variety of forces strained the republican democratic re-
gime, especially in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.9
These forces, including industrialization, urbanization, and immigration,
redounded upon each other, their effects rippling through society. Yet,
republican democracy proved flexible and resilient. Through the nine-
teenth century and into the 1920s, virtue and the common good remained
the overarching principles of government, though their specific meanings
changed in response to the cultural, social, and economic pressures."o
Eventually, however, in the early 1930s, the republican democratic re-
gime collapsed and a new one-pluralist democratic-supplanted it. By
this time, the reality was that the American population was more hetero-
geneous than ever before; the majority of Americans lived in cities, and
more Americans were working for wages in factories than working their
own farmland."
Unlike republican democracy, the intellectual furniture for pluralist
democracy was thoroughly modern. Theorists who conceptualized the
new democracy in the late 1930s and 1940s were committed to histori-
cism, ethical relativism, and social science empiricism. From the histori-
cist perspective, history demonstrated that social, cultural, and political
arrangements were contingent and changeable and that human inventive-
ness could produce endless (though not inevitable) progress.12 Empiri-
cists believed that the path to knowledge lay in experience: the study of
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
8. Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why
Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 434-35 (2006).
9. Feldman, supra note 1, at 166-97 (discussing in greater detail the development and effects
of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration).
10. For example, political parties were initially considered to be illegitimate factions, see
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 596-617 (1993), but they became
an accepted republican democratic institution in the 1820s and 1830s. See EDWARD PESSEN,
JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS 197-232 (rev. ed. 1985); HARRY L.
WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 171-74 (1990).
I1. See THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 409 (1965) (Table: Manufactures Summary: 1849 to 1954) (providing statistical measure-
ments reflecting increasing industrialization); id. at 14 (Table: Population in Urban and Rural Terri-
tory) (providing statistics showing population from rural to urban areas).
12. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 19, 84-85 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, VOYAGE];




external reality. Social science empiricism thus entailed the observation
of human behavior, generalizations describing such behavior, and predic-
tions about future behavior. Moreover, among intellectuals, the commit-
ment to empiricism engendered an ineluctable acceptance of ethical rela-
tivism; facts and values were distinct. If knowledge must be grounded on
experience, then ethical values seemingly could not be verified. Individ-
uals could and did assert values, but scientists could not empirically test
the validity of those values."
These modem intellectual components-historicism, ethical relativ-
ism, and social science empiricism-were manifested in political reali-
ties. In his New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt pushed for progress (in accord-
ance with historicism), for immediate action guided by empirical experts:
he relied on legal and social-science experts to shape and administer leg-
islation that responded to the economic needs of a multitude of American
constituencies. The New Dealers passed fifteen legislative acts during the
first 100 days of Roosevelt's first term, and they continued enacting leg-
islation in accordance with the needs and interests of the American peo-
ple fighting a depression.14 Instead of dismissing the preferences and
values of immigrants, indigents, religious minorities, and other peripher-
al groups as being non-virtuous, instead of denigrating their desires and
goals as contravening the common good, FDR and his New Deal col-
leagues sought to incorporate these groups into the polity and to satisfy
their interests. As one of FDR's close advisers, Rex Tugwell, said,
"[T]he New Deal is attempting to do nothing to people, and does not
seek at all to alter their way of life, their wants and desires."15 Conse-
quently, FDR led the nation toward a more open and inclusive form of
democracy. Mainstream and old-stock Protestant values, long the foun-
dation for the ideals of virtue and the common good, were now to be
balanced with the values of other Americans who constituted the demo-
graphically diverse population. No single set of cultural values was au-
thoritative. Consistent with ethical relativism, Roosevelt and the New
Dealers considered all values and interests, or at least a plurality of such
values and interests.16
13. See WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MORALS 3-4, 8 (1929) (arguing that individuals
admitted that their own moral codes lacked foundations).
14. E.g., Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended as
42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2006)); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
15. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 339 (1963)
(quoting REX TUGWELL, THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY 319 (1935)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Speech (Sept. 23, 1932), in 3 GREAT
ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864-1981, at 335,
341-42 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice Hofstadter eds., rev. ed. 1982). Roosevelt was far more
solicitous of African American interests than any previous president, yet he often sacrificed black
interests and values so as to keep white Southerners aligned with the Democratic party. See Feld-
man, supra note 1, at 327-28. Also, Roosevelt eventually broke with and became antagonistic to-
ward big business. Id. at 318-19, 324.
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Pluralist democracy thus revolved around the assertion of interests
and values by sundry individuals and groups.17 The pursuit of self-
interest no longer amounted to corruption; rather, it defined the nature of
(pluralist) democracy. The crux of the new democracy was participation
in the political process: to express one's values and interests through the
appropriate channels; to have governmental officials listen to those ex-
pressions of values and interests; and to have the government, acting
through experts, fulfill one's desires in a reasonable number of instanc-
es.' 8 According to pluralist democratic theorists, the only way to deter-
mine public values and goals was through a process of "free competition
[among] interest groups."' 9 By "composing or compromising" their dif-
ferent values and interests, 20 the "competing groups [would] coordinate
their aims in programs they can all support." 21 Legislative decisions
therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and the exertion of pressure
through the normal procedures of democratic government.22 Process ra-
ther than substance (such as the substance of the common good) deter-
mined the legitimacy of governmental actions.23
Pluralist democracy achieved hegemony during the post-World War
II era as the correct theory and practice of government, but it did not go
unchallenged. European 6migrds such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt,
and Eric Voegelin, all of whom had escaped from Nazi Germany in the
1930s, raised the most persistent oppositional views.24 By the end of the
1940s, Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin were established political philoso-
phers within the American intellectual community. Thus, they experi-
enced the rise and entrenchment of pluralist democracy from both an
insider perspective, living and working in the United States, and an out-
sider perspective, having matured intellectually in Europe. While they all
appreciated the American constitutional system-the United States, after
all, had provided them with refuge-they could not accept unbridled
celebrations of American democracy.25 While in Europe, they had not
17. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-
1939, at 254-57, 362-66 (1990) (discussing the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active partic-
ipants on the national political stage).
18. John Dewey was an early pluralist democratic theorist. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM
AND CULTURE 176 (1939) (discussing the "methods" of democracy).
19. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 9
(1949).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 10-11.
23. Robert A. Dahl provided the most comprehensive description of the pluralist democratic
process. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 83, 106, 109-11 (1989); ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-71 (1956).
24. See JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY 194-98 (1993) (discussing
the arrival of the 6migrds).
25. Strauss's writings include: LEO STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN (1968)
[hereinafter STRAUSS, LIBERALISM]; LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN (1964) [hereinafter
STRAUSS, CITY]; LEO STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1959) [hereinafter STRAUSS,
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY]; LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) [hereinafter
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only witnessed the collapse of the democratic Weimar Republic into Na-
zi totalitarianism, they had suffered personal hardships and dislocations
because of the Nazi perversions of the state. Strauss and Arendt fled
Germany because they were Jews, while Voegelin left because he had
published books contravening Nazi race ideology. From their vantage,
American democracy was too fragile to leave unexamined.26
Part I of this Article explores the views of Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin as they dissented from pluralist democracy. Part II discusses
their influences on politics, political theory, and law.28 One caveat might
clarify the goal of this Article. The transition from republican to pluralist
democracy was unquestionably momentous, but whether it should be
characterized as revolutionary is arguable, turning more on one's defini-
tion of revolution than the nature of the transition itself. If one maintains
that a revolution must be speedy or sudden, then this transition might not
qualify. It started with a buildup of economic, cultural, and social pres-
sures in the late-nineteenth century and lasted at least through the decade
of the 1930s.29 One can reasonably argue that the Supreme Court did not
accept pluralist democracy until 1937.30 Numerous commentators,
STRAUSS, NATURAL]; LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (Elsa M. Sinclair
trans., 1952) [hereinafter STRAUSS, HOBBES]. Arendt's writings include: HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION (Penguin Books 1977) (1963) [hereinafter ARENDT, REVOLUTION]; HANNAH ARENDT,
THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958) [hereinafter ARENDT, HUMAN]; HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (1973 ed. 1951) [hereinafter ARENDT, ORIGINS]. Voegelin's writings include:
ERIC VOEGELIN, ORDER AND HISTORY: ISRAEL AND REVELATION (Maurice P. Hogan, ed., Univ. of
Mo. Press 2001) (1956). [hereinafter VOEGELIN, ORDER]; ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF
POLITICS (1952) [hereinafter VOEGELIN, NEW]. Books and essays discussing one or more of the
6migrds include: BARRY COOPER, ERIC VOEGELIN AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1999); SHADIA B. DRURY, LEO STRAUSS AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT (1997); MICHAEL P.
FEDERICI, ERIC VOEGELIN (2002); GEORGE KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT (1983); TED V. MCALLISTER,
REVOLT AGAINST MODERNITY (1996); JOHN MCGOWAN, HANNAH ARENDT (1998); GEORGE H.
NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: SINCE 1945 (2008 ed. 1976);
THOMAS L. PANGLE, LEO STRAUSS (2006); STEVEN B. SMITH, READING LEO STRAUSS (2006);
DANIEL TANGUAY, LEO STRAUSS (Christopher Nadon trans., 2007); DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS,
PHILOSOPHY, TERROR (1999) [hereinafter VILLA, POLITICS]; DANA R. VILLA, ARENDT AND
HEIDEGGER (1996) [hereinafter VILLA, ARENDT]; RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Judging-the Actor and
the Spectator, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 221 (1986) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, Judging]; RICHARD
J. BERNSTEIN, Rethinking the Social and the Political, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES, supra, at 238
[hereinafter BERNSTEIN, Rethinking]; George Kateb, The Questionable influence of Arendt (and
Strauss), in HANNAH ARENDT AND LEO STRAUSS 29 (Peter Graf Kielmansegg et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Kateb, Questionable]; Stephen A. McKnight, Voegelin's New Science of History, in
ERIC VOEGELIN'S SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MODERN MIND 46 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991); Nathan
Tarcov & Thomas L. Pangle, Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy, in HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 907 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
26. See Kateb, Questionable, supra note 25, at 29 (emphasizing that Strauss and Arendt were
skeptical of modem democracy).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 32-106.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 107-240.
29. Feldman, supra note 1, at 153-208, 291-348 (discussing pressures leading to breakdown
of republican democracy).
30. See id. at 349-82 (discussing the Justices' acceptance of pluralist democracy).
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though, have referred to the transition as revolutionary. 3 ' For purposes of
this Article, the designation of the transition from republican to pluralist
democracy is irrelevant. It is crucial, however, to comprehend the enor-
mous transformation that American government underwent during this
time, shifting from one paradigm of democracy to another. This Article
is about those contemporaries who experienced and perceived the para-
digm change but nonetheless opposed it. Given how Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin will influence subsequent political and theoretical develop-
ments-by the late-twentieth century, for instance, Strauss will be known
as the godfather of neoconservatism-their contemporaneous reactions
to the emergence of pluralist democracy provide an unparalleled and
invaluable glimpse inside a paradigm shift central to the American fu-
ture.
I. THE EMIGRE DISSENTERS
A. Leo Strauss
Strauss launched a sustained critique of the interrelated intellectual
components of modernity that supported pluralist democracy. Histori-
cism, Strauss explained, "seems to show that all human thought is de-
pendent on unique historical contexts that are preceded by more or less
different contexts and that emerge out of their antecedents in a funda-
mentally unpredictable way."32 Pit in different words, historicism stress-
es the (historical) context of all perceptions and experiences. With every-
thing becoming contextual and therefore contingent, historicism allows
us to look constantly toward the future. Awareness of the past can lib-
erate us from that past. If we know when and why an institution-let's
say a particular common law rule of property-first developed, then we
can more readily choose to modify or abandon that institution.3 4 To be
sure, we are not guaranteed to progress in the future, epoch by epoch, but
we can nonetheless aim "toward ever greater prosperity . . . enabl[ing]
everyone to share in all the advantages of society or life."
Yet, Strauss warned, historicism undermines the very possibility of
knowledge and understanding. For example, historicism leads us to con-
clude that we cannot specify the content of justice because it appears to
31. See, e.g., MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL 124-64 (2000) (referring to
New Deal as constitutional revolution).
32. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 19.
33. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 59.
34. Id. at 67.
35. STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at 4. Strauss continued:
The progress toward ever greater prosperity would thus become, or render possible, the
progress toward ever greater freedom and justice. This progress would necessarily be the
progress toward a society embracing equally all human beings: a universal league of free
and equal nations, each nation consisting of free and equal men and women.
Id.
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vary from society to society, from context to context. Justice means one
thing in the United States, another thing in China, and another thing in
Egypt-or so the historicist claims.37 More broadly, "[a]ll understanding,
all knowledge... , presupposes a frame of reference . . . , a comprehen-
sive view within which understanding and knowing take place." 3 8 Thom-
as Kuhn, the renowned historian and philosopher of science, would soon
refer to this overarching frame of reference as a paradigm. 39 The problem
with this outlook, Strauss argued, is that "[t]he comprehensive view of
the whole [or, in other words, a paradigm] cannot be validated by reason-
ing, since it is the basis of all reasoning." 40 We always must choose
among competing viewpoints, but we are left "without any rational guid-
ance."41 Each viewpoint is "as legitimate as any other."42 But then,
Strauss asked, is not historicism "self-contradictory?" 43 How can histori-
cism claim that it is a valid viewpoint itself?" And even more important,
when humanity is ostensibly freed of all "permanencies,"45 such as
knowing "the distinction between the noble and the base,"46 then we are
too apt to spiral into terror, as happened with Hitler and the Nazis. "It
was the contempt for these permanencies which permitted the most radi-
cal historicist in 1933 [to gain power] ."7
Strauss attacked the pretensions of modem social science with equal
vigor. Social scientists claim that facts and values must be separated:48
"the Is and the Ought" cannot be joined.4 9 They posit that all knowledge
must be empirical, based on experience of facts, and that therefore social
science must be "value-free" and "ethically neutral.,,50 But to Strauss,
modem social science is wrong-headed on several counts. Most simply,
he argued that value-free social science is impossible. Values seep into
36. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 97 (explaining how the conventionalist posi-
tion undermines claims ofjustice).
37. See STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 63 (arguing that historicism ties
political philosophies to specific places and times).
38. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 26.
39. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1-9 (2d ed. 1970).
40. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 27.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id.
45. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 26.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 27.
48. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 39-40. Strauss focused his analysis, in particular,
on Max Weber's explication of social science. Id. at 36-78; see also STRAUSS, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 23 (tracing the desire for value-free social science to Weber). For
Weber's views, see MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils
& Henry A. Finch trans., 1949); MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1946); Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of Max Weber 's
Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law, 16 LAw & SOC.
INQUIRY 205 (1991).
49. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 41.
50. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 19; STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note
25, at 16-17, 40-41.
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any social or political analysis in numerous ways, from the choice of
research questions to the definition of terms." At a deeper level, to insist
on value-free social science, including political science, would be to ren-
der it meaningless: "It is impossible to study social phenomena, i.e., all
important social phenomena, without making value judgments. . . . A
man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities,
and insane impostors may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say any-
thing relevant about politics and political history."52
Even if value-free social science were possible, the single-minded
focus on empirical research, on facts, would necessarily preclude any
knowledge of values and ends. From the modem standpoint, values,
which are the sources of our goals or ends, are not subject to scientific
(empirical) determination and therefore are not knowable. 53 Modem so-
cial science leads us, then, to ethical relativism.
[T]here cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought. [The modem
social scientist] denied to man any science, empirical or rational, any
knowledge, scientific or philosophic, of the true value system: the
true value system does not exist; there is a variety of values which
are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with one another, and
whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason. Social science or
social philosophy can do no more than clarify that conflict and all its
implications; the solution has to be left to the free, non-rational deci-
sion of each individual. 54
Modem social science, with its desire to be empirical and "neutral
in the conflict between good and evil," 5 relegates us to a radical and
irrational individualism-where each person acts on arbitrary prefer-
ences-and ultimately, to nihilism. 56 Not only must we "recognize all
preferences or all 'civilizations' as equally respectable," we must ac-
cept that "[ilf our principles have no other support than our blind prefer-
ences, everything a man is willing to dare will be permissible."58
Strauss, in sum, concluded that modernity is imploding: its own
premises inevitably cause the edifice of modernity to collapse upon it-
self. But as Strauss would insist, the rise of the Nazis and the ensuing
Holocaust were not wrong merely from a relative perspective. According
to Strauss, we must have more than irrational individual preferences and
culturally relative values if we are to avoid sliding toward nihilism and
51. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 21-25.
52. Id. at 21.
53. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 40-41.
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 18.
56. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 4-5; STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note
25, at 18-19.
57. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 5.
58. Id. at 4-5.
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accepting genocide. And as modernity goes, Strauss added, so goes plu-
ralist democracy. Built on the modernist premises of historicism, empiri-
cism, and relativism, not onily is pluralist democracy indefensible from a
Straussian standpoint, but it also perches us precariously on the edge of a
moral abyss.5 9 But then what should we do? Strauss did not want to re-
pudiate democracy, though he found its current instantiation in the Unit-
ed States to be frail and dangerous. 60 To a degree, he sought to modify
and therefore save democracy. Strauss, it seems, wanted answers. After
all, Strauss criticized modernity for leaving us with only contingencies,
for undermining the certainty of ostensible answers. But what solutions
did Strauss propose in response to the problem of democracy and the
crisis of modernity?
Unfortunately, at this very point, Strauss's writings became far
murkier. He turned to philosophy-specifically classical political philos-
ophy-because, he argued, it could lead us from opinion to truth.6 1
Strauss feared that the methods of modern social science structure our
understandings of politics and government by injecting the fact-value
dichotomy. 62 To avoid being led astray in this manner, we must return to
a "pre-scientific understanding" of politics6 3-"a coherent and compre-
hensive understanding of what is frequently called the common sense
view of political things." 64 And ancient or classical philosophy can pro-
vide us with that pre-scientific or "original form of political science."65
Yet, Strauss acknowledged that classical political philosophy cannot
provide us with clear and direct access to solutions for our current diffi-
culties.66 We cannot solve our problems by pretending to live in a Greek
polis; a global economy, nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of na-
tion-states present us with unique political dilemmas. Even so, we must
quest after "universal knowledge" of the truth, quest for answers to our
dilemmas, and ancient philosophy might guide us on our journey. But
59. E.g., STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 37-38; see STRAUSS,
LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 3-25 (discussing liberal education); PANGLE, supra note 25, at 77-78
(discussing Strauss's emphasis on the degeneration of democracy); TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note
25, at 927-30 (discussing Strauss's criticisms of liberal democracy).
60. "We are not permitted to be flatterers of democracy precisely because we are friends and
allies of liberal democracy." STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 24; see SMITH, supra note 25,
at ix (describing Strauss as friend to democracy); TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 909 (noting
that Strauss viewed himself to be a friend to liberal democracy). But see DRURY, supra note 25, at
133-35 (arguing that Strauss was hostile to democracy).
61. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at I1-12, 66.
62. STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at 11-12.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 11; PANGLE, supra note 25, at 26-28; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 918-
19.
67. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 11.
68. STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at I1; PANGLE, supra note 25, at 76-77; TARCOV &
PANGLE, supra note 25, at 910-13.
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the end of the quest might never be reached-it might never become
visible.69
In his quest for truth, Strauss insisted that we consider whether the
ancients had correctly linked political philosophy with natural right. 70 To
explore this possibility, Strauss distinguished between the classical (or
ancient) and modem concepts of natural right. According to the ancients,
natural right could be comprehended only in connection "with a teleolog-
ical view of the universe," Strauss explained.7 1 "All natural beings have a
natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is
good for them." 72 Natural right, then, arose from the inherent end or pur-
pose of a political regime. That is, "classic natural right doctrine . . . is
identical with the doctrine of the best regime." 73 The philosophical quest
for natural right amounts to a search for "the perfect moral order."74
Strauss left ambiguous, it should be noted, the precise relationship be-
tween classical (or ancient) natural right and classical (or ancient) natural
law. Sometimes he appeared to distinguish between natural right and
natural law, but other times he appeared to use the terms interchangea-
bly. 75 In fact, when Strauss equated classical natural right with the best
regime or perfect order, he defined natural right in a manner that resonat-
ed closely with commonplace definitions of natural law.7 6 Strauss him-
self referred to natural law as "an objective order."7 7 That societal order
or best regime, Strauss suggested, entailed "doctrines [that] taught the
duties of man."7 8 Thus, at one point, Strauss wrote: "Traditional natural
law is primarily and mainly an objective 'rule and measure', a binding
order prior to, and independent of, the human will." 7 9
Regardless, Strauss unequivocally stressed a break between classi-
cal natural right (and natural law) and modem natural right (and natural
69. Straussians might claim that Strauss engaged in esoteric writing. He distinguished the
exoteric political writings or teachings that were useful and palatable in the philosopher's particu-
lar context-from the esoteric-political writings or teachings that were aimed for universal truths
but that were left more obscure. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 226-29;
PANGLE, supra note 25, at 56-65; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 914.
70. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 81-89 (discussing the origin of natural right).
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id.; see MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 30 (explaining that Strauss characterized natural
right as referring "to proper governing"); TANGUAY, supra note 25, at 118 (explaining that Strauss's
notion of natural right focused on the best regime).
75. For instance, when discussing the relationship between religion and the best regime,
Strauss wrote that "natural right or, rather, natural law becomes independent of the best regime and
takes precedence over it." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 144. But see TANGUAY, supra note
25, at 118-19 (distinguishing between natural right and natural law).
76. See, e.g., FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 85-89 (describing how proslavery advo-
cates argued for a natural order in society).
77. STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xii. Strauss also wrote: "According to the classics,
the best constitution is a contrivance of reason. ... It is in accordance with nature, or it is a natural
order." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 314.
78. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 182.
79. STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xi.
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law).80 To be sure, Strauss's historical narrative is idiosyncratic: tradi-
tional accounts tend to describe a logical movement from premodernity
to modernity that links the ancient and modem notions of natural right
(passing relatively smoothly from antiquity through Christianity and into
secularity).8 1 But Strauss emphasized discontinuity: the sharp distinction
between the ancients and the moderns helped explain, according to
Strauss, the fragility of modem democracy. Machiavelli initiated modem
political theory by rejecting the ideals of Plato and Aristotle for the nitty-
gritty of realpolitik. Instead of describing the just or perfect republic,
Machiavellian political theory guides the ruler who must maneuver
through the pitfalls of reality.82 Strauss argued, then, that Hobbes sought
to retain Machiavelli's realism while reintroducing "moral principles"
into politics-reintroducing, that is, natural right (and natural law).8 ' To
do so, Hobbes focused on "the fear of death, and, more particularly, the
fear of violent death at the hands of others."84 In Hobbesian political the-
ory, as interpreted by Strauss, "[d]eath takes the place of the telos,"85 and
"natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-preservation."8 6
Thus, unlike in classical political philosophy where natural right starts
with the best political regime, which then engenders certain duties and
responsibilities, Hobbes's modern political theory starts from an asser-
tion of individual natural right-"from an absolutely justified subjective
claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order, or
obligation, is itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation."8 Conse-
quently, Hobbes concluded that "[t]he state has the function, not of pro-
ducing or promoting a virtuous life, but of safeguarding the natural right
of each."88
80. Id. at xi-xii; STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 120.
81. TANGUAY, supra note 25, at 102-03, 118.
82. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 177-79; McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 154-56;
e.g., NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Luigi Ricci trans.), reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE
DISCOURSES I (Modem Library ed. 1950); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN
BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIUS (Christian E. Detmold trans.), reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE
DISCOURSES, supra, 99 . While Aristotelian virtue strove for human excellence, Machiavellian virt6i
strove for political usefulness, for the preservation of the political community (or republic) in a
treacherous world. FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 12, 14-15; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note
25, at 916-17.
83. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 179; e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1968).
84. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 180.
85. Id. at 181.
86. Id.
87. STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xii. "Traditional natural law is primarily and mainly
an objective 'rule and measure', a binding order prior to, and independent of, the human will, while
modem natural law is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of 'rights', of subjective claims,
originating in the human will." Id. at xi-xii; see STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 181 ("[T]he
fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right. . . .").
88. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 181. "Hobbes jettisoned the entire tradition of
political philosophy oriented toward human excellence, thus freeing the state from any obligation
other than safeguarding individual natural rights." MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 157.
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Even further, according to Strauss, not only did the early modems,
like Hobbes, transform (and diminish) natural right, the later modems
repudiated it altogether. 89 Jeremy Bentham, for one, is famous for deni-
grating "[n]atural rights [as] simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts."90 Bentham's disciple,
John Austin, rejected the concept of natural law as "ambiguous and mis-
leading."9' Indeed, many critics insisted that widespread disagreements
about the content of natural right demonstrated that it was inherently and
hopelessly ambiguous. 92 In the United States, the Framers' generation
had been firmly committed to natural right (and natural law), yet after the
Civil War, numerous American jurisprudents repudiated it.93 According
to jurist and scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., natural-law jurists suf-
fered from a "naive state of mind." 94 Modernists stopped searching for
universals (rights and laws) in nature and instead focused on historical
changes, individual claims of right, and sovereign assertions of law.95
When Strauss considered whether the ancients had correctly linked
political philosophy with natural right, he emphasized that the mere disa-
greement among individuals and societies about the content of natural
right does not logically necessitate its repudiation.96 Because the rejec-
tion of natural right ultimately leads, he argued, to the monumental mod-
ernist problems of historicism and relativism, we should demand stronger
proof before jettisoning the possibility of natural right, and from
Strauss's perspective, such proof is not forthcoming. 97 Not only did
Strauss, then, want to contemplate the truth and implications of natural
right, he reconsidered the fundamental republican democratic principles.
In opposition to pluralist democracy and its countenanced pursuit of self-
89. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 298-99 (explaining how Burke does not begin
from natural right); see MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 30 (explaining that Strauss traced the devel-
opment of modernity "until, finally, the entire concept of nature had dissolved as a useful assump-
tion."). Thus, Strauss wrote: "The problem of natural right is today a matter of recollection rather
than of actual knowledge." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 7.
90. JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 489, 501 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
91. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 19 (Wilfrid E. Rumble
ed., 1995) (1832). Austin wrote, "[T]o say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are
not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense." Id. at 158.
92. "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest
men have differed upon the subject ..... Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.,
concurring); see FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 85-90 (describing how the disagreements
between abolitionists and proslavery advocates over the content of natural law and natural right
contributed to the demise of natural law in America).
93. See FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 93-94 (discussing the positivism of postbellum
Langdellian legal scientists).
94. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1918), reprinted in The
Essential Holmes 180, 181 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
95. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 7-8 (discussing the modernist rejection of
natural right); cf, FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 91-136 (discussing the modernist approach
to law).
96. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 97.
97. Id. at 9-34.
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interest,98 Strauss sought to resurrect the common good. "Laws are just to
the extent that they are conducive to the common good. But if the just is
identical with the common good," 99 he reasoned, "the just or right cannot
be conventional: the conventions of a city cannot make good for the city
what is, in fact, fatal for it and vice versa. The nature of things and not
convention then determines in each case what is just." 00 Consequently,
Strauss continued, the political activities of citizens and governmental
officials should be virtuous, aiming for perfection and justice.'o
B. Hannah Arendt
Despite the difficulty of deciphering Strauss's writings, Arendt's
work might be even more complex. Like Strauss, Arendt criticized mo-
dernity in the shadow of the Holocaust. 102 To Arendt, modernity generat-
ed danger: it not only rendered possible totalitarianism, Nazism, and the
Holocaust, but also threatened the United States and its pluralist demo-
cratic system with risks unrecognized by most Americans.103 Arendt
maintained that modernity relegates humanity to a meaningless quest
after the best instrumental means for achieving ultimately arbitrary
ends.'" A vacuous willingness to conform replaces a desire for genuine
freedom. 05 Individuals dwell on self-interest and economic prosperity,
while humanity celebrates the processes that produce specious historical
progress. 0 6 People universally "demand . . . happiness," 0 7 but suffer
"the mass phenomenon of loneliness"'0o and "widespread unhappi-
ness"109 I short, Arendt argued that modernity drains away the juices
that sustain human vitality and leaves a shriveled, moribund carcass. But
unlike Strauss, Arendt concentrated less on the problems of modernity
and more on a solution: politics. For Arendt, politics (or political action)
could provide a cure for the ills of modernity: politics could be the
source and the realm of meaningful human existence."l0
98. See id. at 106-07.
99. Id. at 102.
100. See Tarcov & Pangle, supra note 25, at 920, 923-24 (discussing common good).
101. STRAUSs, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 133-34; STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 25, at 40, 94.
102. See ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at vii-viii; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 3-5.
103. See MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-17, 24, 38-39. According to Arendt, "[I]dentity has
been disconnected from citizenship in modem society, with the result that we modems have lost our
sense of what politics is for. What characterizes the masses from whom totalitarian leaders derive
their support is their lack of political commitment ...... Id. at 16. Arendt, in other words, empha-
sized the danger inherent in personal isolation and political apathy, which subsequent commentators
would stress in describing the United States. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 46-47, 107 (2000).
104. See VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 10-11.
105. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 40-41.
106. Id. at 33, 296-97; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-17, 36-38.
107. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 134.
108. Id. at 59.
109. Id. at 134.
110. Id. at 29-31.
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What, then, is political action, according to Arendt? In modernity,
we often associate politics with economic interests and disputes. For
instance, a debate about whether to enact social welfare legislation that
would provide food stamps for indigent individuals would be an arche-
typical political contest. But for Arendt, this debate would be social ra-
ther than political, where the social is a bastard combination of the pri-
vate and public (political) spheres."' Arendt sought to maintain a sharp
"division between the public and private realms, between the sphere of
the polis and the sphere of household and family, and ... between activi-
ties related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of
life."l 2
Arendt, in other words, narrowed the scope of politics. Indeed, crit-
ics have wryly noted that "Arendt rules out as nonpolitical almost every-
thing we usually think of politics being 'about.'"" ' The precondition for
politics, as Arendt conceptualized it, was plurality: "the fact that men,
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.""l4 To be clear, Arendt
emphasized a plurality or "diversity of opinions"'' 5 rather than a plurality
or "multiplicity of interests""' 6-where opinions refer to individual views
of, for instance, the common good, and interests refer to individual or
group desires or goals. And a community could not sustain the requisite
plurality of opinions without protecting the "unique distinctness," the
individuality, of each person.1 7 "If men were not distinct, each human
being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they
would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood.
Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants
would be enough.""'8 Arendt explained that the medium of political ac-
tion, the way that people can initiate and participate in politics, is by
speaking.'" And it is through political speech-that is, political action-
that "men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they
are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as
physical objects, but qua men."' 20 In other words, political action is how
one realizes his or her humanity-taking the initiative to be a unique
111. See id. at 27-29.
112. Id.at28.
113. McGowan, supra note 25, at 75; see BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 248-49
(criticizing Arendt's distinction of the political and the social).
114. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 7; see Kateb, supra note 25, at 14.
115. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 226.
116. Id.
117. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176.
118. Id. at 175-76. Plurality also assumes a type of equality among individuals. KATEB, supra
note 25, at 14.
119. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 26-27, 179; VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 31-35.
Arendt, in effect, justifies the protection of free expression: "Opinions will rise wherever men com-
municate freely with one another and have the right to make their views public . ARENDT,
REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 227.
120. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176.
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person in meaningful coexistence with other unique persons.121 Arendt
depicted the ancient Greek polis as illustrating a political or "public
realm":122 it "was reserved for individuality; it was the only place where
men could show who they really and inexchangeably were." 2 1 Plurality
and individuality, then, are integrally intertwined. Plurality exists only
when humans can realize or actualize their uniqueness, while unique
individuality can be actualized only in relation to a plurality of others.12 4
Conformity, it follows, obliterates the possibility for political action: "no
formation of opinion is ever possible where all opinions have become the
same." 25
Political action, Arendt continued, not only "must be done in com-
pany with others," 26 but also must be "for the sake of all." 27 That is,
through "the benefit of a multitude of opinions," 28 a community can
specify the "public spirit" or common good.129 What, then, is the content
of the common good? Arendt never answered this question with more
than vague conundrums. She explained that political action "is not a
means to some end beyond itself,"',3 0 and that "[t]o act politically is to
talk about politics."' 3 1 The common good, it would seem, equates with
political action itself. To act politically is to achieve the common good.
Thus, the creation, preservation, or both of a site facilitating political
action would constitute the common good.132
Humans can experience true freedom, Arendt maintained, only
when they engage in political action. It is "a body politic which guaran-
tees the space where freedom can appear." 33 When we confound the
political with the private and slide into the social-as we have in moder-
121. Arendt emphasized taking the initiative, an "impulse" to begin "something new." Id. at
177; see ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 216 (emphasizing "a deliberate act" as "the foun-
dation of freedom"); id. at 223 (discussing "the spirit of the new").
122. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 41.
123. Id. Arendt emphasized speech in describing politics in the Greek polis:
To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and
persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force peo-
ple by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with
people characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the house-
hold head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers, or of life in the barbarian empires of
Asia, whose despotism was frequently likened to the organization of the household.
Id. at 26-27.
124. BERNSTEIN, Judging, supra note 25, at 223.
125. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 225.
126. KATEB, supra note 25, at 14.
127. Id.
128. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 225.
129. Id.
130. KATEB, supra note 25, at 16.
131. Id. at 17.
132. See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 255 (describing Thomas Jefferson's desire
for a ward system of government as emphasizing a public space or site for politics); KATEB, supra
note 25, at 119 (discussing how "[t]he common interest is the preservation of the frame of action, a
constitution").
133. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 125.
2012] 685
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nity-we tend to define freedom in accord with the social realm. 13 4 We
think freedom is the pursuit, for instance, of economic prosperity. We
believe freedom "requires and justifies" only "the restraint of political
authority."' Freedom becomes "located in the realm of the social, and
force or violence becomes the monopoly of government."l36 We forget
that freedom lies in political action itself. Arendt insisted that freedom
"means the right 'to be a participator in government', or it means noth-
ing."l37 Thus, freedom and politics are indivisible: "Freedom is a good
valued for its own sake, not for anything it allows us to produce, gain, or
achieve. And freedom is exercised only in [political] action."' 38
Arendt's most sustained discussions of politics revolve around anti-
thetical examples: the combined actions of revolution and constitution
making as prototypical political activities, on the one hand, and the im-
position of totalitarianism, on the other. A revolution, Arendt argued,
aims "to bring about the formation of a new body politic;"' 39 it is when
"the political way of life begins." 4 0 Building "the foundation of a body
politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear,"l41 a suc-
cessful revolution establishes a "foundation of freedom" 4 2 and demands
"the constitution of a republic."l 43 The key to the triumphant American
Revolution, then, was the drafting of constitutions in numerous states
simultaneous with the issuance of the Declaration of Independence.144
Under modem conditions, the act of foundation is identical with the
framing of a constitution, and the calling of constitutional assemblies
has quite rightly become the hallmark of revolution ever since the
Declaration of Independence initiated the writings of constitutions for
each of the American States, a process which prepared and culminat-
ed in the Constitution of the Union, the foundation of the United
States.145
Arendt underscored the nature of revolution and the narrowness of
the political realm, as she conceptualized it, by comparing the American
and French Revolutions. While the American Revolution succeeded
largely because it concentrated on establishing a public space for free-
dom-that is, for political action-the French Revolution failed largely
because it failed to do the same. The American revolutionaries included
134. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 30-31, 40.
135. Id. at 31.
136. Id.
137. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 218.
138. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 45.
139. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 35.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 125.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 33.
144. Id. at 141.
145. Id. at 125.
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the poor, but these people, according to Arendt, were "not miserable."1 4 6
The French revolutionaries, though, needed to deal with an immense
number of wretchedly impoverished people. 147 Consequently, during the
French Revolution, the private and the social infected the political realm.
And when a revolution tries to solve the social problem of poverty-the
drive of the impoverished for basic needs-the opportunity to achieve
political freedom is sacrificed to economic necessities.148 "Nothing, we
might say today, could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate man-
kind from poverty by political means; nothing could be more futile and
more dangerous. . . . The result was that necessity invaded the political
realm, the only realm where men can be truly free."l 49 Indeed, Arendt
insisted that the Framers of the United States Constitution erred by
dwelling more on the creation for citizens of a private space for econom-
ic activities than a public space for political freedom.' 50 American (na-
tional) government, for instance, operates through representatives, so
citizens too frequently forget politics; they confuse economic liberty with
political freedom.' 5 ' The people lose "the opportunity of being republi-
cans and of acting as citizens."' 52
While the making (or defending) of a constitution exemplifies polit-
ical action,'53 the imposition of totalitarian government contravenes poli-
tics and freedom. 5 4 Totalitarianism, Arendt explained, destroys plurality:
in the political realm, individuals are isolated, and in the private realm,
they are doomed to loneliness.'55 A totalitarian government dismantles
both the public and private realms. "It is the very nature of totalitarian
regimes to demand unlimited power. Such power can only be secured if
literally all men, without a single exception, are reliably dominated in
every aspect of their life."' 56 Hence, under totalitarian rule, the people
endure "the experience of not belonging [t]o the world at all, which is
among the most radical and desperate experiences of man."' 57 The epit-
ome of totalitarianism is the concentration camp, where inmates suffer
severe deprivation and isolation and can barely remember political free-
dom.'" 8 The inmates are forced to view survival as "the competition of
146. Id. at 68.
147. Id. at 67-68.
148. Id. at 113-14; BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 243-45.
149. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 114.
150. Id. at 253.
151. Id. at 268-69; KATEB, supra note 25, at 19.
152. AR ENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 253.
153. See KATEB, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing "the defense of a constitution or form against
internal erosion or external attack").
154. See ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 475, 478-79; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 29;
VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 187-91.
155. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25,Id. at 475; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 16.
156. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 456.
157. Id. at 475.
158. See id. at 437-41; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-16, 29.
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all against all, creating a highly atomized society."l59 As Arendt conclud-
ed, "A life without speech and without action . . . is literally dead to the
world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived
among men."o60 A concentration-camp survivor, in Arendt's words, liter-
ally "returns to the world of the living."1 6 1
From Arendt's perspective, as should now be clear, the deprivation
of political freedom and action is catastrophic, even though she casts the
scope of political action as extraordinarily narrow. Indeed, if one thinks
in terms of republican and pluralist democracies, Arendt's concept of
politics is neither.1 6 2 Unlike republican democratic thinkers, who stressed
the significance of having a relatively homogenous population, Arendt
urged the importance of plurality, which obviously resonates with plural-
ist democracy. But unlike pluralist democratic theorists, Arendt repudiat-
ed a plurality of interests and instead emphasized a plurality of opinions.
Like a republican democratic thinker, Arendt alluded to the common
good, proclaiming that politics should aim to be "for the sake of all,"1 63
but then she left us with a puzzling tautology, explaining that the com-
mon good equated with political action in pursuit of the common good.'
Like a pluralist democratic theorist, Arendt favored "equal and full par-
ticipation in the political,""' but then she rejected any pursuit of eco-
nomic well-being in the political realm.'66 Arendt would admit that stra-
tegic and instrumental thinking might be appropriate in the social realm,
but they are never acceptable in politics; thus, social science experts who
might guide us in choosing the best means to achieve predetermined ends
can never contribute to political action.'67 Ultimately, Arendt scorned
pluralist democracy as a process-structured pursuit of self-interest:
Through pressure groups, lobbies, and other devices, the voters can
indeed influence the actions of their representatives with respect to
interest, that is, they can force their representatives to execute their
wishes at the expense of the wishes and interests of other groups of
voters. In all these instances the voter acts out of concern with his
private life and well-being, and the residue of power he still holds in
his hands resembles rather the reckless coercion with which a black-
159. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 16-17.
160. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176; see VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 181-82
(emphasizing the uniqueness of totalitarianism).
161. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 444.
162. See McGOWAN, supra note 25, at 81 (discussing the difficulty of categorizing Arendt's
concept of political action).
163. KATEB, supra note 25, at 14.
164. Arendt is often criticized for emptying political speech of all significant content. See
VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 36-40-41.
165. MCGOwAN, supra note 25, at 25.
166. Id. at 48-49; cf id. at 48 (discussing general welfare as economic and thus not appropriate
for political realm). Also, Arendt sometimes suggested that only those able or qualified to be politi-
cal should be allowed to participate in political activity. VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 35, 39-
40.
167. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 61; BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 253-54.
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mailer forces his victim into obedience than the power that arises out
ofjoint action and joint deliberation.
As Arendt peeled away elements of republican democracy and plu-
ralist democracy, her goal emerged, however nebulously. She aimed to
articulate a "pure politics," an exhilarating communal connection among
political actors.' 69 Individuals engage in political speech or action solely
for the purpose of creating and disclosing their meaningful identities to
other individuals.o70 They seek to achieve no other ends because if they
do quest after more, then they necessarily corrupt their political actions.
When an individual pursues self-interest, acts instrumentally or strategi-
cally, or seeks economic or social justice, then he or she cannot actualize
meaningful self-disclosure. The true person is obscured. "Without the
disclosure of the agent in the act,"' 7 ' Arendt wrote, "action loses its spe-
cific character and becomes one form of achievement among others. It is
then indeed no less a means to an end than making is a means to produce
an object."' 72 When the purity of politics is violated, then political
"speech becomes indeed 'mere talk,' simply one more means toward the
end, whether it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody with
propaganda."173 Thus, from Arendt's standpoint, "Nothing justifies [po-
litical] action; nothing is gained or accomplished through action. Action
is simply the embodiment, the realization, of freedom-and requires
nothing further to be experienced as a good." 74
But there is a problem: Arendt has refined politics to a point so mi-
croscopic that it has perhaps disappeared from view. The concrete occur-
rence of political action would seem to be "almost miraculous."' 7 1 In her
effort to lead us toward a potentially exhilarating form of politics, she
instead has led us to a utopian abyss.176 If politics is neither the republi-
can democratic pursuit of a substantive common good nor the pluralist
democratic pursuit of self-interest, then what is it? Why would individu-
als engage in political speech, as limited by Arendt? What, exactly,
would they talk about? Arendt would answer: individuals would speak to
achieve self-disclosure. Maybe so, yet one must wonder: would Arendt's
notion of self-disclosure be enough to prompt political action in a real as
opposed to a utopian world, or would it leave the political realm inert?
Arendt wrote that the "revelatory quality of speech and action comes to
168. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 269.
169. KATEB, supra note 25, at 21.
170. In pure politics, "[a]lthough nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in




174. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 61 (emphasis added).
175. BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 243 (describing manifestations of the "revolu-
tionary spirit" as "almost miraculous").
176. See McGOWAN, supra note 25, at 34.
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the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them-
that is, in sheer human togetherness."1 77 Sheer human togetherness? Is
Arendt, here, urging us toward political action or some type of unformu-
lated communal ecstasy?178
C. Eric Voegelin
Like Strauss and Arendt, Voegelin criticized modernity. He argued
that individuals always view their respective societies as structured or
ordered so as to be endowed "with meaning in terms of ends divine and
human."1 79 Thus, individuals develop a "self-interpretation" that suppos-
edly reflects the "cosmic order."so The main problem with modernity,
according to Voegelin, is that its roots are twisted around a cancerous
misinterpretation of society vis-A-vis "the transcendent order of be-
ing."18 1
In particular, modernity has developed askew because of an ac-
ceptance of "gnosticism."l82 In Voegelin's terminology, gnosticism is the
belief that a particular type of knowledge can enable an individual to
attain salvation or deliverance (or escape an alienated existence). Put in
different words, gnosticism is "a belief in the power of knowledge to
transform reality, to create earthly perfection."' 83 Modernity evolved as
gnostics adopted the concept of Christian (sacred) eschatology and ap-
plied it to the saeculum. Christian eschatology posited stages of spiritual
advancement culminating in the City of God, but early modernists ex-
tended this sacral periodization of time into the secular realm. 184 The
result was a belief in the modernist idea of progress: the conviction that
human ingenuity could engender endless advancement in the material
world, endless forward movement for humankind.18 1
As Voegelin phrased it, the idea of "Christian transcendental [or es-
chatological] fulfilment" had become "immanentized"-brought within
177. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 180.
178. Arendt imagined political actors as if they stood behind some Rawlsian super-veil of
ignorance. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (articulating Rawls's veil of
ignorance theory). Critics of Rawls questioned whether he had drained away the essence of humani-
ty by positing that political actors forget their specific identities. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 128-32 (1982); Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liber-
alism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]). For Rawls's attempt to reformulate his theory in response to his
critics, see RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra, at 22-28.
179. VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 19.
180. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 167.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 126.
183. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 21; see McKnight, supra note 25, at 60.
184. For a discussion of the Christian concept of eschatology and its adoption into modernist
thinking, see HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 37 (Robert M. Wallace
trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1983) (1966).
185. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 22-23; McKnight, supra note 25, at 59.
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the reach of humans in "mundane existence."' 86 And Voegelin here was
insistent: "Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton ... is a theo-
retical fallacy." 8 7 In the perverted world of modernity, "man assumes
God's role as the primary actor leading history to its culmination (telos),
reason rather than revelation becomes the instrument for attaining saving
knowledge, and concrete European nation-states become terrestrial para-
dises in which humanity finds the fulfillment of its highest aspira-
tions."188 In short, the modern world suffers from a spiritual disorder or
pathology that confounds the sacred and the secular. 89
Of course, Voegelin explained, modernists do not recognize that
their idea of progress arises from a perverted gnosticism. They believe
that a conviction in progress rests firmly on a rational (and secular)
ground. They convince themselves that humanity advances by question-
ing or doubting religion, but in reality, modernists have immanentized
Christian concepts, applying them to the mundane world. Therefore,
modernists are hubristic: they display excessive pride in their capabilities
to achieve untold tasks that, in actuality, lie beyond their limited powers.
Such hubris is most evident in the social sciences. Social scientists mis-
takenly assume that they can apply the methods of the natural sciences to
gain objective knowledge of human society and politics.190 But, Voegelin
insisted, the insistent application of scientific method leads social scien-
tists to skew their inquiries. Because they practice "value-free science,"
which maintains a dichotomy between facts and values,' 9' social scien-
tists treat humans "as discrete objects," separated "from the transcenden-
tal context," from the spiritual realm.19 2 By necessity, social scientists
limit their research goals to fit the constraints of their (scientific or em-
pirical) method, and consequently, they must dismiss (as unscientific)
any potential insights gleaned from other methods. 193
To be certain, the empiricism of scientific method produces some
types of progress, but at a steep cost. We gain formal or instrumental
rationality, but lose our substantive moorings. Voegelin wrote:
The death of the spirit is the price of progress. Nietzsche revealed
this mystery of the Western apocalypse when he announced that God
was dead and that He had been murdered. This Gnostic murder is
constantly committed by the men who sacrifice God to [secular] civi-
lization. The more fervently all human energies are thrown into the
186. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 120; McKnight, supra note 25, at 66.
187. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 120 (emphasis added)..
188. McKnight, supra note 25, at 59.
189. See COOPER, supra note 25, at 136; MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 169-71.
190. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 58-59.
191. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 173 (quoting Voegelin).
192. COOPER, supra note 25, at 67-70; MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 173 (quoting
Voegelin).
193. See COOPER, supra note 25, at 68; VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 3-26; McKnight,
supra note 25, at 55-56.
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great enterprise of salvation through world-immanent action, the far-
ther the human beings who engage in this enterprise move away from
the life of the spirit. And since the life of the spirit is the source of
order in man and society, the very success of a Gnostic civilization is
the cause of its decline.194
Thus, modernist societies are spiritually, religiously bankrupt. And
to make matters worse, gnosticism encourages people to believe that
mundane "ersatz realities" can fill the spiritual "vacuum."195 Modernist
societies are, in a sense, "narcissistic": they dwell on humans as the
source of salvation (and progress). 19 6 Human inventiveness and ideas
replace faith. 19 7 This narcissistic reliance on human ideologies, Voegelin
lamented, has led to catastrophic modernist experiments in civilization,
including not only Nazism and Communism but also liberalism and de-
mocracy.19 8 "The closure of the soul in modern Gnosticism can repress
the truth of the soul," Voegelin wrote, "but it cannot remove the soul and
its transcendence from the structure of reality."' 99
Even so, Voegelin still found that "there is a glimmer of hope" in
our situation, though "it will require all our efforts to kindle this glimmer
into a flame by repressing Gnostic corruption." 200 What must we do to
defeat gnostic modernism? Return to the "divine ground of being": we
must comprehend the natural order of society. 20 1 For Voegelin, this re-
turn, this comprehension, requires a resurrected devotion to Christianity,
which he deemed the best interpretation of God and experience. 2 02 Fur-
thermore, Voegelin argued that, by recognizing the fundamental spiritual
element of human existence, we could create a "new science of poli-
tics." 20 3 To do so, instead of blindly following empirical scientific meth-
od, we would need to specify the proper object of study and then develop
and apply the best method for understanding that object.20 Given
Voegelin's focus on the spiritual, he drew on Aristotelian methodology
to describe how people interpret (or self-interpret) the interrelated expe-
riences of the secular and spiritual realms. By developing a "history of
order"-a history of how various societies have structured or ordered
themselves and have interpreted their "ends divine and human"-
194. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 131. In fact, Voegelin even criticized Strauss and
Arendt for each using methods that reproduce gnostic modernism. See COOPER, supra note 25, at
132-39.
195. McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172 (quoting Voegelin).
196. Id. at 171 (quoting Voegelin).
197. Id. at 22.
198. See MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172-74; VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 164-65,
173-74; see also NASH, supra note 25, at 74 (describing a trend of conservative critics of liberalism
in the early 1950s).
199. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 165.
200. Id. at 189.
201. McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172.
202. Id. at 252; VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 163-65.
203. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 3.
204. Id. at 4-5; COOPER, supra note 25, at 68; McKnight, supra note 25, at 55-56.
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Voegelin believed that he could help humanity struggle toward a "true
order."2 05 Most important, this true order would entail a spiritual mar-
shaling because, ultimately, "God and man, world and society form a
primordial community of being." 20 6 To Voegelin, we need to grasp the
significance of this intertwined existence of God and humanity and hold
it tightly. For without spirituality, Voegelin warned, we are doomed to
desolation.
H. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DISSENTERS
Pluralist democracy might be distasteful, with its emphasis on self-
interest, its grounding on ethical relativism (tied to empiricism), and its
excessive reliance on process. Any governmental system, it seems, must
ultimately pursue substantive goals, which implicitly if not explicitly
manifest certain values. Is pluralist democracy so bereft of foundational
values that it might be unworkable and even dangerous in the long run,
as all three political theorists feared? Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin prof-
fered diverse solutions: Strauss looked to ancient philosophy to provide
foundational values; Voegelin believed religion could reconnect us to a
spiritual order; and Arendt sought to purify politics of all corrupting
forces at the outset. But despite their efforts, one is left with an uncom-
fortable conclusion: we cannot easily identify a practical alternative to
pluralist democracy. Viewed together, Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin
demonstrate a crucial truth about our pluralist democratic world. The
transition from republican to pluralist democracy cannot be undone.
Take Voegelin. Compared to Strauss and Arendt, Voegelin was "the
mystic." 2 07 Political salvation, he maintained, lay in religious salvation.
To restore "the forces of civilization," we would need to return to a spir-
itually ordered society.208 And here lies the problem with Voegelin's
solution. With his emphasis on religion and, more specifically, on Chris-
tianity, he appeared to seek a resurrected "medieval order." 209 Unsurpris-
ingly, then, his message appealed to a coterie of "Catholic, traditional
conservatives," but it could not captivate a more diverse group of Ameri-
can intellectuals. 2 10 And without doubt, most Americans could not abide
a historical approach that equated Hitler and Harry Truman as practition-
ers of gnostic politics-regardless of whether many of those same Amer-
icans could believe that "[h]istory is a story told by God." 2 1 1 Meanwhile,
according to Strauss, philosophy-especially ancient political philoso-
phy-revealed a potential answer to the messy political maneuverings
205. VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 19.
206. Id. at 39.
207. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 222.
208. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 189.
209. VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 22.
210. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 252, 271, 297 n.1; NASH, supra note 25, at 536.
211. MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 252; see NASH, supra note 25, at 74; VOEGELIN, NEW,
supra note 25, at 170-73.
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that infected modernity. He repudiated pluralist democracy and, like
Voegelin, sought to lead us on "a return to origins." Whereas Voegelin
sought to resurrect a medieval Christian order, Strauss sought to resurrect
republican democracy. But Strauss's desired republican democratic re-
gime could not skirt an overwhelming obstacle: it did not culturally and
socially fit Strauss's twentieth-century world.2 12 Finally, Arendt, too,
repudiated pluralist democracy, yet she refused to attempt the full rever-
sal of direction necessary for a return to either a republican democratic
regime or a Christian order.213 Instead, she imaginatively tried to
reconceptualize politics to avoid the pitfalls of both republican and plu-
ralist democracies. For Arendt, politics rather than philosophy or religion
provided the solution for the ills of modernity.214 But Arendtian politics
was so purified of the issues usually associated with political debate that
one would be hard-pressed to find any practical implications for Ameri-
can government. In the end, despite Strauss's, Arendt's, and Voegelin's
contrasting tendencies-Strauss favoring ancient philosophy; Arendt
favoring politics; and Voegelin favoring religion-none of them was
215able to provide a ready alternative to pluralist democracy.
I do not mean to suggest, though, that the three were not influential.
As mentioned, Voegelin, without exerting wide political pull, appealed to
a handful of traditionalist conservatives. The sheer impenetrability of his
writings undoubtedly dissuaded some other potentially sympathetic read-
ers. Displaying an astounding erudition in philosophy, religion, and his-
tory, Voegelin was compelled to coin numerous terms and phrases to
communicate his complex thoughts; to understand Voegelin, then, one
needs to penetrate this unique vocabulary. For that reason, his expositors
often include a glossary of Voegelinian terminology to enlighten wary
readers.2 16 Even so, despite the denseness of Voegelin's writings, Time
remarkably featured him in a 1953 article,2 17 but alas, frustrated maga-
zine readers responded with letters condemning the article as "gobbledy-
gook," "revolting," and "garbled nonsense." 2 18
Arendt, no easy read herself, claimed to focus more on politics than
philosophy, yet her political theory had little connection to social reality.
212. See VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 8.
213. "While Arendt is unquestionably antimodern in a broad sense, she hardly shares the
cultural conservative's wish to return to the premodern. Arendt refuses to deal in this type of nostal-
gia." Id at 174. Yet, as Villa discusses, some commentators have characterized Arendt as also at-
tempting to resurrect the civic republican tradition. VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 165-66.
214. See VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 155-56 (contrasting Strauss's turn to philosophy
and Arendt's turn to politics).
215. The three thinkers, though, also overlapped significantly. For instance, Arendt might have
favored politics, but she was an accomplished political philosopher. Voegelin might have favored
religion, but his erudition on political philosophy was unsurpassed. Strauss might have favored
ancient philosophy, yet he demonstrated great respect for religious traditions.
216. FEDERICI, supra note 25, at 207-36; EUGENE WEBB, ERIC VOEGELIN 277-89 (1981).
217. Max Ways, Journalism andJoachim's Children, TIME, Mar. 9, 1953, at 57-61.
218. FEDERICI, supra note 25, at xxiv, 192 n.8.
694 [Vol. 89:3
DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT
Consequently, her abstractions have not significantly swayed politicians
or political advocates. Regardless, her writings have been heralded with-
in the world of political theory.2 19 Most notably, her conception of a pure
politics influenced the German philosopher Jirgen Habermas's devel-
opment of his renowned communication theory. 220 Habermas posited the
existence of an ideal speech situation: a counterfactual intersubjective
encounter that is cleansed of domination, coercion, and other distortions
arising from economic power and strategic maneuvering. 22' The ideal
speech situation, as such, "makes possible unforced universal agree-
ment." 22 2 A consensus that emerges from the ideal speech situation re-
flects only the force of the best argument and thus allows us to identify
truth and normative legitimacy.223 Thus, just as Arendt aimed for a poli-
tics purified of extraneous considerations, Habermas aimed for commu-
224nication purged of distorting material and strategic forces. Habermas
then built on this theory of communicative action to articulate a dis-
course theory of democracy, grounded on his notion of an "ideal com-
munication community." 225
Strauss is unique, being the only of the three 6migrds to have wield-
ed substantial influence in the concrete world of American politics. Nu-
merous neoconservatives have drawn sustenance from Strauss's thought.
Of course, one should not mistake influence for intent. Strauss rarely
wrote with the purpose of directly intervening in American political de-
bates,2 26 though he was not apolitical. Despite the ambiguities in his writ-
ings, Strauss's imprimatur of the common good, virtue, and natural right
manifested unmistakably conservative political leanings.227 He admitted
that the pursuit of virtue and the common good might require the exclu-
219. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 98.
220. See Jurgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power (Thomas
McCarthy trans.), reprinted in HANNAH ARENDT: CRITICAL ESSAYS 211, 212-14 (Lewis P.
Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 1994) (tying Habermas's theory of communicative action to
Arendt's political theory).
221. JORGEN HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1, 105-10 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979).
222. Jflrgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 181, 206 (1980).
223. Id. According to Habermas, "all speech acts oriented to reaching understanding" presup-
pose the validity claims of sincerity, truth, and normative legitimacy. JORGEN HABERMAS, REASON
AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 307 (1984) (emphasis added). We presuppose, in other
words, that speakers sincerely assert the truth and normative legitimacy or rightness of their proposi-
tions. Id
224. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida,
and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296, 308 (2005).
225. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322 (William Rehg trans., 1996). See generally Feldman, supra
note 224 (discussing Habermas more extensively in conjunction with Gadamer and Derrida).
226. See MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 221.
227. See PANGLE, supra note 25, at 83-85; cf DRURY, supra note 25, at xi (noting that even
Strauss's students disagree about his meaning); STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at v-viii
(discussing the difficulty of even defining liberalism and conservatism).
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sion of some individuals from the polity,2 28 as well as the coercive con-
trol of others. An individual "cannot achieve the perfection of his human-
ity,"229 cannot be virtuous, "except by keeping down his lower impuls-
es." 230 To control such lower impulses, Strauss argued, sometimes de-
mands coercion. Hence, rather than stressing the maximization of free-
dom and autonomy, Strauss suggested that coercion sometimes amounts
to the common good. "Justice and coercion are not mutually exclusive; in
fact, it is not altogether wrong to describe justice as a kind of benevolent
coercion. Justice and virtue in general are necessarily a kind of power.
To say that power as such is evil or corrupting would therefore amount to
saying that virtue is evil or corrupting."23 1 In light of such sentiments,
Strauss inclined predictably toward other conservative outlooks. He was
adamantly anti-communist232 and was far more elitist than egalitarian,
stressing that not everyone is equally virtuous. 2 33 On this point, Strauss's
notion of political practice can be fruitfully contrasted with that advocat-
ed by Arendt.
For Arendt, a healthy politics is an agonistic politics of open, never-
ending debate; a politics that takes place in a public realm free of
force and coercion, upon a 'stage' suitable for the expression of hu-
man plurality and civic equality. For Strauss, a healthy politics is one
in which the gentry or gentlemen rule; in which the passions of the
demos are restrained by the virtues of their betters; in which enough
order and freedom are present for the pursuit of philosophy; and in
which philosophers can stand as potential 'umpires' over political-
moral disputes.234
Regardless of Strauss's intentions and the sparseness of his overtly
political writings, he has wielded considerable sway as the so-called
"godfather" of neoconservatism.235 Neocons such as Irving Kristol and
Allan Bloom echoed Straussian themes with their attacks on the ethical
relativism of modernity and the substantive vacuity of pluralist democra-
cy. 2 36 They called for a renewed "moral clarity" that harkened back to the
228. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 130-32.
229. Id. at 132.
230. Id. at 132-33.
231. Id. at 133.
232. Tarcov & Pangle, supra note 25, at 933. "[I]t could no longer be denied that Communism
will remain, as long as it lasts in fact and not merely in name, the iron rule of a tyrant .... "
STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at 5.
233. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 134-35, 140-1. The masses form and follow opin-
ions, but the elite seek the truth. See id. at 12.
234. VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 156. George Kateb categorizes Arendt as being hyper-
democratic, wanting more democracy. KATEB, QUESTIONABLE, supra note 25, at 30. Kateb catego-
rizes, Strauss as being "antidemocratic" and "authoritarian" Id. at 39.
235. DOUGLAS MURRAY, NEOCONSERVATISM: WHY WE NEED IT 30 (2006).




republican democratic concepts of virtue and the common good.23 7 They
denounced liberal social engineering programs, such as affirmative ac-
tion, as being grounded on falsities propagated by hubristic social scien-
tists. 2 38 Moreover, because the neocons exerted political power during
Republican presidencies, several neoconservative oriented Justices have
been appointed to the Supreme Court and have subsequently brought
neoconservative themes to bear in their decisions and opinions, especial-
ly those related to constitutional jurisprudence. 2 39 The now standard con-
servative invocation of originalism denotes a desire to return to a pre-
1937 republican democratic style of judicial review. For instance, the
neoconservative emphasis on virtue and moral clarity has surfaced in
several free expression-religious freedom cases where the Court has re-
quired the government to provide funding or public building access to
240organizations spreading religious messages. In the Establishment
Clause context, neoconservative Justices, such as Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia, have attacked the 'wall' metaphor, which suggests that
church and state are strictly separated. Maintaining that the wall meta-
phor is too hostile to religious values, they instead have advocated for
non-preferentialism: the government, according to this viewpoint, cannot
prefer one religion over another but otherwise can favor religion over
irreligion.24 1 Supposedly following an originalist approach, Thomas has
gone so far as to argue that state and local governments should be consti-
tutionally permitted to establish religion. 24 2 n short, while pluralist de-
mocracy remains predominant, the 6migr6s' dissenting voices have made
(and continue to make) their marks in American political thought and
government.
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morrah 289 (1996) (explaining non-preferentialism).
242. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 852-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2012] 697

